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INTRODUCTION
What if you could grow a baby in a jar? Well, now you can, sort
of. Pediatric researchers at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia
have now created a unique womb-like device that mimics a woman’s
uterus—complete with prenatal fluid and a pumpless oxygenator.1
They tested and monitored the effects of the artificial womb on fetal
lambs, which “are developmentally equivalent to . . . extreme[ly] pre-
mature human infant[s].”2 The lambs displayed normal breathing,
swallowing, and eye function; grew wool, and had normal growth,
neurological function, and organ maturation.3 This new technology
is envisioned to transform the care of extremely premature infants
* Julia Dalzell, Esq., JD, University of San Diego Law School, 2018 BA, Economics,
The Pennsylvania State University, 2015. I extend my thanks to the editors of William
and Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice for all their hard work and sup-
port in publication.
1. See Emily A. Partridge et al., A Unique Womb-Like Device Could Reduce Mortality
and Disability for Extremely Premature Babies, CHILD. HOSP. PHILA. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://
www.chop.edu/news/unique-womb-device-could-reduce-mortality-and-disability-ex
tremely-premature-babies [https://perma.cc/5KUZ-QH6B] [hereinafter Partridge et al.,
Womb-Like Device]; see also Olga Khazan, Babies Floating in Fluid-Filled Bags, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/04/preemies-floating-in
-fluid-filled-bags/524181 [https://perma.cc/9XCG-QP79]; Emily A. Partridge et al., An Extra-
Uterine System to Physiologically Support the Extreme Premature Lamb, NATURE COMM.
(Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15112.pdf [hereinafter Partridge
et al., Extra-Uterine System].
2. Partridge et al., Extra-Uterine System, supra note 1, at 1.
3. See id. at 2 (demonstrating that “extreme premature fetal lambs can be consistently
supported in an extracorporeal device for up to 4 [sic] weeks without apparent physiologic
derangement or organ failure. These results are superior to all previous attempts at extra-
corporeal support of the extreme premature fetus in both duration and physiologic well-
being.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Partridge et al., Womb-Like Device, supra note 1.
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and prevent severe morbidity.4 If the test results translate into clin-
ical care, the researchers speculate that in as little as a decade’s
time, extremely premature infants could continue to develop in these
artificial wombs filled with amniotic fluid instead of lying in incu-
bators—a relatively dated form of technology that does little to stim-
ulate growth.5
While other researchers had previously attempted to develop an
artificial womb (without much success),6 the researchers at the Chil-
dren’s Hospital addressed issues of “sterility, size adaptability and
efficiencies of space and fluid volume,” resulting in the creation of
what they coined the “Biobag.”7 The Biobag is a single-use, completely
closed system that can be customized to closely replicate the size
and shape of the human uterus.8 The Biobag is made from a translu-
cent film to permit ease of monitoring and scanning.9 Fetuses trans-
ferred to the Biobag are delivered via Caesarean section, given a drug
to prevent breathing outside air, and immediately submerged into
the artificial womb.10 The delivery itself is no more hazardous than
a routine premature delivery; more than sixty percent of extremely
premature babies are currently delivered via Caesarean section.11
Although researchers have reassured the artificial womb is to
be used only as a bridge to extend gestation before eventual transfer
4. See Partridge et al., Extra-Uterine System, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that “over
one-third of all infant deaths and one-half of cerebral palsy [cases are] attributed to
prematurity”); see also Partridge et al., Womb-Like Device, supra note 1 (stating that “there
could be a large economic impact as well, reducing the estimated $43 billion annual medical
costs of prematurity in the U.S.”).
5. See Partridge et al., Womb-Like Device, supra note 1.
6. See Partridge et al., Extra-Uterine System, supra note 1, at 2 (“The primary
obstacles have been progressive circulatory failure due to preload or afterload imbalance
imposed on the fetal heart by oxygenator resistance and pump-supported circuits, the use
of open fluid incubators resulting in contamination and fetal sepsis and problems related
to umbilical vascular access resulting in vascular spasm.” (footnotes omitted)).
7. Id. at 2.
8. For more on the science behind the “Biobag,” see id. at 3–4 (explaining that “[t]he
Biobag consists of polyethylene film that is translucent, sonolucent and flexible to permit
monitoring, scanning and manipulation of the fetus as necessary. An open, sealable side
was incorporated to facilitate insertion of the fetus at the time of cannulation, and
various water-tight ports were designed to accommodate cannulas, temperature probes
and sterile suction tubing. After cannulation, the Biobag is sealed and transferred to a
mobile support platform that incorporates temperature and pressure regulation, padding
and the fluid reservoirs and fluid exchange circuitry. The development of the Biobag essen-
tially solved the problem of gross fluid contamination, and has eliminated pneumonia on
lung pathology. Throughout the subsequent experiments, low-level amniotic fluid contami-
nation was observed only in circumstances where Biobag re-entry was required. When this
occurred, contamination could be cleared by increasing the fluid exchange rate and inject-
ing antibiotics into the bag fluid on a daily basis.”).
9. See id. at 3.
10. See Khazan, supra note 1.
11. Id.
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into an incubator, it is not unreasonable to speculate that this device
could transform assisted reproductive technology as we know it.12
Artificial wombs, where a baby could be gestated from conception to
birth, could be extremely beneficial for those who cannot procreate
on their own. Same-sex couples, and even single fathers could benefit
from the growing of a baby in an artificial womb. Multiple pregnan-
cies that often result from fertility treatments could be reduced to
single pregnancies by transferring “extra” embryos into artificial
wombs. The need and use of human surrogacy, a field fraught with
debate, could be eliminated.13 There could also be broader, positive
implications for the working woman. Artificial wombs could diminish
the challenges some women in the workforce face while pregnant—
passing up job opportunities or tenure positions or not being offered
maternity leave, among others.14 Artificial wombs could eliminate
health risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth.15 Further-
more, it could eliminate hormonally induced issues such as postpar-
tum depression.16 Arguably, an artificial womb, with a sterile and
controlled environment, could create a better outcome for the child,
eliminating environmental issues of alcohol, drugs, and other toxins,
while decreasing birth defects and malnutrition.17
12. See Partridge et al., Extra-Uterine System, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that “[o]ur
goal is not to extend the current limits of viability, but rather to offer the potential for
improved outcomes for those infants who are already being routinely resuscitated and
cared for in neonatal intensive care units. Finally, the implications of this technology
extend beyond clinical application to extreme premature infants. Potential therapeutic
applications may include treatment of fetal growth retardation related to placental in-
sufficiency or the salvage of preterm infants threatening to deliver after fetal intervention
or fetal surgery. The technology may also provide the opportunity to deliver infants af-
fected by congenital malformations of the heart, lung and diaphragm for early correction
or therapy before the institution of gas ventilation.”); see also Adam Rogers, What if You
Could Grow a Baby in a Bottle?, WIRED (Apr. 30, 2017, 7:00 AM), https:// www.wired.com
/2017/04/grow-baby-bottle [https://perma.cc/T9H7-FD6J].
13. Conflict often arises in surrogacy when a gestational carrier refuses to subsequently
give up the child after birth or if the carrier refuses to adhere to contractual obligations
to abort under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Julia Dalzell, The Enforcement of Selective
Reduction Clauses in Surrogacy Contracts, 27 WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 83,
83–85 (2018).
14. It is not farfetched, however, to imagine employers in this utopian world requiring
women employees to “use artificial wombs to avoid maternity leave” or insurance com-
panies mandating their use to avoid expenses with complicated pregnancies and deliveries.
See, e.g., Rob Stein, Scientists Create Artificial Womb That Could Help Prematurely Born
Babies, NPR (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017
/04/25/525044286/scientists-create-artificial-womb-that-could-help-prematurely-born
-babies [https://perma.cc/A8WX-THC9].
15. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not of Woman Born: A Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE W.
RES. L.REV. 399, 408–09 (2011).
16. See Alkistis Skalkidou et al., Biological Aspects of Postpartum Depression, 8
WOMEN’S HEALTH 659, 659 (2012).
17. See Hendricks, supra note 15, at 410–11, 413 (“[S]ocial norms might come to con-
demn natural gestation as animalistic.”). Artificial wombs could create a safer environment
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Artificial wombs seem as if they could substantially improve the
reproductive successes of many.18 Yet, many opponents believe the
use and development of artificial wombs would further diminish a
woman’s role in our society, replacing the most unique and natural
abilities of a woman with man-made machines.19 Others fear this
technology might spawn the trading of babies like commodities.20
These concerns of turning procreation into manufacture should be
disregarded as highly unlikely—fictional at best.21 And others, while
recognizing the technology could bring vast medical improvements,
do not trust women “to resist the seductive power” of doctors and
technology, and fear giving women too free a range of choice.22
than natural pregnancy, with the exception that any mistake would be made on a “large
scale.” See id. at 412. Opponents would argue there is this certain je ne sais quoi to
natural pregnancy that bonds mother and child that must be cherished and prized and
cannot be reproduced in any other manner. See id. at 441–42. But see id. at 443 (“Some
parents might even feel more connected to a child developing in the machine than to one
growing inside a partner or a paid gestational mother. Perhaps, for example, the machine
would have a window; visually oriented people might feel closer because they could see
the fetus.”). There is also research on gene expression changes in the placenta during
pregnancy that would not happen during artificial womb gestation. See id. at 424–26.
18. Some go further to argue ending human pregnancy would finally “free women
from reproductive ‘tyranny’, [sic] severing oppressive physical ties between women and
children, thus creating equality between the sexes.” See Sarah Langford, An End to Abor-
tion? A Feminist Critique of the ‘Ectogenetic Solution’ to Abortion, 31 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L
F. 263, 264 (2008).
19. See Christine Rosen, Why Not Artificial Wombs?, NEW ATLANTIS J. TECH. & SOC’Y
67, 72 (2003) (quoting Robyn Rowland, “[W]ill women become obsolete?”); id. at 74 (“[P]er-
haps we shouldn’t treat the human womb like just another organ to be replicated and
improved upon.”).
20. See Irina Aristarkhova, Ectogenesis and Mother as Machine, 11 BODY & SOC’Y 43,
53 (2005) (explaining that artificial womb technology “plac[es] [women] in oppositional
relation to the progress of reproductive science, that is simplistically presented as just
wanting to take increased control of the realm of ‘captured wombs.’ . . . [and] women and
their ‘populated wombs’ as passive, brainwashed receivers of whatever ‘doctors-men-
fathers’ decide to implant there.”); see also Hendricks, supra note 15, at 443 (“The practice
of ectogenesis may actually encourage the parties involved to abandon the fetus. First,
further commodification of reproduction might foster a consumer mentality among
prospective parents.”). Hendricks’s point, however, assumes that couples use assisted re-
productive technology (ART) on a whim. In actuality, the couples or individuals who turn
to ART often have struggled with procreating for years. They have invested ample time
and money into creating a child they have yearned for. I highly doubt the emergence of
artificial wombs will create a new subclass of couples who could afford to use the technol-
ogy, would prefer to use it over natural gestation, and who would decide to use it without
extensive contemplation.
21. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 1–19 (Harper & Bros. 1946) (illustrating
a futuristic society in which humans are gestated outside the body); see also Rosen,
supra note 19, at 71–72 (quoting Roger B. Dworkin, “[p]resumably babies would be cre-
ated because someone wanted a baby. To imagine some hideous scenario of millions of
babies created artificially for some specific purpose strikes me as unrealistic.”).
22. See M.L. Lupton, Artificial Wombs: Medical Miracle, Legal Nightmare, 16 MED.
& L. 621, 627 (1997) (describing how “[a]long the way, women lost a fundamental respect
for their bodies that protected the integrity of their breasts and wombs. Today, women
are being drugged, suctioned, scraped, scanned, shaved, injected and cut open by the
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Transferring a fetus from a woman’s uterus to artificial womb,
or even growing a fetus from start to finish in an artificial womb,
could redefine our legal definition of “viability” and the beginning of
“life.” Artificial wombs might make it possible that viability, under
current legal jurisprudence, would occur near the moment of concep-
tion,23 which could gravely limit a woman’s access to and choice of
abortion. Furthermore, with the advent of the artificial womb, state
interest in protecting potential life could eliminate the practice of
abortion altogether—mandating that all babies be instead extracted
and transferred to artificial wombs.
This Article will focus on the implications of the artificial womb
for abortion and viability standards and how we should redefine re-
productive rights and state interests to evolve along with the upcom-
ing technology. I will argue why a woman’s right to an abortion needs
to be solidified and unbundled to ensure that it outweighs any state
interest in outlawing abortions to opt for the “pro-life” alternative
of artificial womb transfer. Although artificial wombs might take
pregnancy out of the picture, this Article will explain why a woman’s
reproductive rights are far-reaching and extend to procreative inter-
ests beyond pregnancy. Additionally, this Article will examine how
the current viability standard under Casey needs to be reevaluated
or abandoned to advance with new technology. Likewise, state inter-
est in “potential life” should either be clarified or unpacked for fear
of being struck down as merely an interest in restricting and limit-
ing the number of abortions for morality reasons. Finally, this Article
will address why a woman’s right to an abortion extends beyond ter-
mination of pregnancy and incorporates the right not to be a mother
and the right not to create a child. Pregnancy, although necessary—or
once necessary—to procreation, is only one part of the process. While
a right to be pregnant and a right to parent or procreate often “work
in tandem, one need not follow the other.”24 This is not to say, how-
ever, that they should never be considered in concert with each other.
But for the advancement of reproductive technology and artificial
wombs, it is important to flesh out the broad category of procreative
rights to pass constitutional muster.
millions. The domain of women has become the domain of doctors. Women’s reproductive
competency is being increasingly sabotaged by their faith in technology. Having embraced
surgery and technology to the extent they have, I have little faith in their ability to resist
the seductive power of the ultimate holy grail viz. the artificial womb.” (footnote omitted)).
23. See Vernellia R. Randall & Tshaka C. Randall, Built in Obsolescence: The Coming
End to the Abortion Debate, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 291, 298 (2008); Jessica H.
Schultz, Note, Development of Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal
Status of a Fetus or Embryo?, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 877, 886 (2010).
24. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
22, 38 (2015).
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Artificial wombs should be embraced for the great medical ad-
vance they are. They should be added to the catalog of assisted repro-
ductive technology options and used in any situation that maintains
a woman’s right to choice over her body and the outcome of her poten-
tial fetus. The use of this technology, however, should not be taken as
a simple alternative to current abortion procedures. Instead, it calls
for redefining and expanding the constitutional right of procreation.
I. ANALYSIS
Abortion jurisprudence was decided long before the possibility of
artificial wombs—when termination of both pregnancy and fetus was
certain.25 The Court was only faced with balancing a woman’s privacy
right against the state interest in protecting the fetus from destruc-
tion.26 This new technology adds a new interest to the mix. Because
an artificial womb could allow a woman to terminate her pregnancy
without terminating the fetus or embryo, a state interest in protecting
potential life could be simultaneously achieved without impacting
a woman’s right to privacy (as her right currently stands).27 However,
would the state be unduly interfering when it limits her choice to only
termination of pregnancy, not termination of fetus? In the context
of artificial wombs, is the state interest in potential life really all
that compelling?
II. ABORTION & VIABILITY
The Court has rejected all arguments that the unborn is a “per-
son” and thus deserving of equal rights, instead opting for a point of
viability at which the fetus can exist without the support of the
mother’s body.28 Previability, a woman’s interest in autonomy out-
weighs the state interest in potential life.29 But, once viable, the state
has an interest in protecting potential life and prohibiting abortion
except when medically necessary for the health of the woman.30 Casey
holds a viability standard of “independent existence” to distinguish
when a woman can rightfully undergo an abortion and when the
state interest in protecting life outweighs that right.31 This does not
mean the fetus must be free from medical intervention.32 Casey notes
25. See Randall & Randall, supra note 23, at 292.
26. Id. at 293.
27. In Part II, I will discuss how a woman’s reproductive rights should be further de-
lineated to accommodate abortions in an era of artificial womb technology.
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158, 160 (1973).
29. See id. at 163.
30. See id. at 163–64.
31. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
32. The Court defines viability generally as the time a fetus was “potentially able to
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that medical advancements may alter viability, but nonetheless up-
holds viability as a critical deciding point.33 Medical advancements
like the artificial womb will affect the balance and primacy of the
state and the woman’s interests. Because an artificial womb would
essentially enable an embryo or a fetus to exist independently of the
woman as soon as transplanted, the current viability standard of
“independent existence” needs to be redefined or abandoned.34
Where to redraw the line for viability is unclear. Some scholars
suggest replacing the current standard with a set number of weeks
in gestation—a bright-line time test35 resembling the now-abandoned
Roe “trimester framework.”36 Medical professionals often disagree
on viability because the determination is case-specific and dependent
on multiple factors.37 Greater clarity could be reached with a rule
focused on developmental milestones or age and dates; however, not
all fetuses develop and grow at the same rate.38 Some advocate for a
redefinition to represent the point the fetus can sustain itself without
any assistive technologies.39 Alluring, but in reality, the only fetuses
likely to survive on their own without any assistance are those born
healthy at nine months.40 Others suggest viability should represent
a stage of “advanced fetal development,” not just fetal independ-
ence.41 We could avoid any necessary changes by simply treating the
artificial womb as an extension of the woman’s uterus, subject to the
live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (footnote
omitted); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“As medical science becomes better able to provide for
the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward
conception.”); Marion Abecassis, Artificial Wombs: “The Third Era of Human Reproduction”
and the Likely Impact on French and U.S. Law, 27 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 11 (2016)
(“[J]udges have long acknowledged that . . . viability standard[s] largely depend[ ] on . . .
medical advances existing at the time of the litigation in question.”).
33. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
34. See Abecassis, supra note 32, at 15–16 (“[A]ttributing the personhood to embryos
from the moment of conception would be very problematic for the sake of embryonic
research, embryonic selection, or abortion. In addition, it would be absurd and extremely
procedurally burdensome to consider each one of the thousand of frozen embryos.”);
Schultz, supra note 23, at 885.
35. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 23, at 903; Hyun Jee Son, Note, Artificial Wombs,
Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling Viability’s Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 213, 223–24 (2005).
36. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s Private Choice,
95 TEX. L. REV. 1189, 1211 (2017) (“Dividing a woman’s pregnancy into three segments,
each of three months, seemed arbitrary and based on little except nine being divisible
by three.”).
37. See Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249,
271 (2009).
38. See id.
39. See Jee Son, supra note 35, at 222.
40. See id. at 223.
41. See id. at 222 (emphasis added).
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same governing laws.42 But this essentially denies same-sex couples
and males, the paradigmatic examples for whom artificial wombs
could benefit, the right to use this technology in a way by which they
could still exercise their procreative rights.43 Another suggestion
continually noted is using “one standard for in utero fetuses and an
entirely different standard for ex utero [fetuses].”44 These standards
seem problematic and could raise possible fairness and equal protec-
tion issues—a couple unable to naturally reproduce being subject to
different standards and penalized for using assisted reproductive
technology. Similarly, legal protections could categorize and “distin-
guish between ‘pre-implantation’ embryos (fertilized eggs, frozen em-
bryos) and ‘post-implantation’ embryos (embryos successfully attached
to a womb), which could be further separated between ‘intracorporeal’
and ‘ectogenetic’ embryos.”45 Subcategories with differing legal sta-
tuses sound appealing, but increasingly complex situations where
embryos or fetuses “jump” from one subclass to another could muddy
the waters.
Post-Casey legal decisions do no better at drawing definitive
viability criterion. Gonzales further blurred the viability line when
upholding a ban on “intact D&E [Dilation and Evacuation]” proce-
dures without regard to the stage of fetal development.46 The Gonzales
Court has been criticized for its inconsistency:
The Court’s conclusion that Congress can legitimately protect
the previable fetus from a brutal death through the intact D&E
procedure raises the question why a legislature may not protect
the same fetus from other brutal abortion techniques. . . . If a
legislature may view the previable fetus as a being that war-
rants protection against the intact D&E procedure, it should be
able to protect the same fetus against the standard D&E. The
dignity of the not-quite-viable fetus does not change depending
on the method by which it will be aborted.47
Arguably, the Court has yet to adequately explain why the viability
demarcation is drawn at the ability for a fetus to survive outside the
womb, and continuing abortion jurisprudence gives little guidance
or clarification. With few persuasive alternatives, a lack of principled
42. See Abecassis, supra note 32, at 20.
43. See id. at 20–21.
44. Schultz, supra note 23, at 903.
45. Abecassis, supra note 32, at 16.
46. Beck, supra note 37, at 278–79. Justice Kennedy explained, “[t]he Act does apply
both previability and postviability because, by common understanding and scientific termi-
nology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable out-
side the womb.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007).
47. Beck, supra note 37, at 278–79 (emphasis added).
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rationale by the Court, and the inevitable intricacies brought about
with new reproductive technology of artificial wombs, we should
abandon the viability standard altogether as an “illegitimate and
arbitrary line, inappropriate for judicial imposition.”48
In abandoning a viability point, a decision of when to terminate
should be left to the mother. Absent health concerns, she is most
likely terminating a fetus before she believes her fetus is a “life.”49
When life begins is not always grounded in science, but instead,
moral, philosophical, or religious views.50 Women will have differing
views and thus should not be held to a singular standard. A state
should not be able to protect an intrinsic value of life, when in doing
so, they are upholding or forbidding matters essentially of religious
or personal beliefs. Abortion should be wholly regarded as a private
choice. With government interference, a woman is possibly forced to
act in defiance of her own beliefs. For example,
[I]t would be intolerable for a state to require an abortion to
prevent the birth of a deformed child. No one doubts, I think,
that th[e] requirement would be unconstitutional. But the rea-
son why—because it denies a pregnant woman’s right to decide
for herself what the sanctity of life requires her to do about her
own pregnancy—applies with exactly equal force in the other
direction. A state just as seriously insults the dignity of a preg-
nant woman when it forces her to the opposite choice, and the
fact that the choice is approved by a majority is no better justifi-
cation in the one case than in the other.51
Accepting there is a point at which the government has an
interest in protecting life as an intrinsic interest detached from any
one being still presupposes that, at some point before birth, a fetus
is a “life” deserving of some sort of moral significance. Drawing any
line with respect to viability seems to fly in the face of “not resolv[ing]
the difficult question of when life begins.”52 Viability is “compelling”
because it is presumably the point at which a fetus can survive out-
side the mother’s womb.53 The fetus becomes a “life” of sorts, or at
48. Id. at 252.
49. Cf. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 36, at 1229–30 (“The best approach to the
abortion issue is for the Court to declare that the decision whether to have an abortion
is a private judgment which the state may not encourage, discourage, or prohibit.”).
50. See id. at 1228 (“The choice of conception as the point at which human life begins,
which underlies state laws prohibiting abortion, thus was based not on consensus or
science, but religious views.” (footnote omitted)).
51. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Over-
ruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 418 (1992).
52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
53. Chemerinsky and Goodwin make a good point when describing pregnancy itself
as uncertain and so to pick a certain point as “viable” is nothing more than arbitrary. See
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least something resembling life, that we deem worthy of protection
at this viability point. And at this point we attribute moral dignity
to the fetus similar to that of any other life form. The Court declared
that it refused to resolve the question of personhood or when life
begins, yet it seems to be doing exactly that when choosing a point
of viability where potential life becomes a protected interest.54
Disallowing states and the Court to determine a point of viability,
a point at which they are inherently defining “life,” would properly
leave this private choice in the woman’s hands.55 However, because
currently a woman’s “right [to an abortion] is not unqualified,”56 once
we abandon the viability standard the Court needs to balance and
reconsider under what circumstances a state’s interest becomes domi-
nant, if any.
III. STATE INTEREST
Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by
a “compelling state interest.”57 In the context of abortions, a state cur-
rently has a compelling state interest only when the fetus is viable.58
If we abandon the current viability standard, does a state still have
a compelling interest in “potential life,” or something else? Even
Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 36, at 1229 (stating that “pregnancy is more precisely
described as bounded in uncertainty. For example, statistically, roughly 10%–20% of known
pregnancies will spontaneously terminate, resulting in miscarriages. Moreover, two-
thirds ‘of all human embryos fail to develop successfully,’ and terminate before women even
know they are pregnant. Even in the most controlled, hormone-rich circumstances, such
as in vitro fertilization—over 65% of the embryos end in demise. . . . In other words,
there is not a probable chance that but for an abortion there will be a baby resulting
from conception.”).
54. See id. at 1211.
55. Some scholars promote focusing on the “social life of the child” and not when life
begins as the central aspect of “choice.” Amy Borovoy, Beyond Choice: A New Framework
for Abortion?, DISSENT MAG. (2011), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/beyond-choice
-a-new-framework-for-abortion [https://perma.cc/9QKA-KMMA]. Amy Borovoy advocates
for the ethical focus to be on the mother’s welfare and the future child’s environment,
which will impact society as a whole. See id. It is not a revelation that unwanted children
born into impoverished families often get stuck in vicious poverty cycles; any Economics
101 class will affirm this fact. However, Borovoy defends this as a driving factor of
whether or not to abort:
[T]he logic is that child rearing and a mother’s health (both physical and
emotional) are central to producing a good society, and that children respond
to the resources and care they receive. This notion of abortion as a social
necessity differs from the notion of abortion as a “right” and deemphasizes
the dividing lines between “life” and “choice.”
Id.
56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
57. Id. at 155 (emphasis added) (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 627 (1969)).
58. See id. at 163.
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when a fetus is viable, the state cannot ban an abortion a doctor deems
medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman.59
The superiority of a woman’s health interest reiterates that the state
interest in potential life is not absolute. At what point, then, does
any state interest outweigh a woman’s right—or does it?
Embryos in laboratories or frozen in cryobanks are routinely
destroyed, abandoned, or forgotten and forever kept frozen.60 The
state does not seize, distribute, or prevent their destruction.61 The
state seems to have no interest in this form of “potential life,” yet we
entertain the idea that states would have an interest when the con-
versation shifts to abortion and artificial wombs. It seems outland-
ish to propose that a state would have an actual or realistic interest
in housing and funding millions of parentless fetuses. “Under state-
mandated womb-emptying, the state would bear the responsibility
of dealing with the resultant children.”62 This assumes the state has
the resources to fund and support not only the use and monitoring
of the artificial wombs themselves, but also the resulting children
who would need to be sheltered and fed by state organizations. A
state-mandated use of artificial wombs in lieu of current abortion
procedures would require the state to fund the embryonic transfer to
artificial womb and make the technology readily available to women.
If a woman could have afforded a traditional abortion procedure, but
now cannot afford the pricey alternative of transfer to artificial womb,
she would be left without any option to terminate her pregnancy.
Therefore, the state would be required to fund these procedures in
order to avoid obstructing a woman’s right to terminate pregnancy.63
In order for the state to mandate this “womb-emptying” and
gather all unwanted fetuses, they would have to prove the fetus was
“abandoned” bodily material.64 Courts have been reluctant to allow
individuals to assert property interests over body materials said to
have been abandoned.65 Conversion claims to excised spleen cells,
59. See id. at 163–64.
60. See Tamar Lewin, Industry’s Growth Leads to Leftover Embryos, and Painful
Choices, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/embryos
-egg-donors-difficult-issues.html [https://perma.cc/J9A4-FLZW].
61. See id.
62. Mark A. Goldstein, Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right and
State Obstacles to Choice in Light of Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 877,
901 (1978) (footnote omitted).
63. See id. at 918–20.
64. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115,
1146 (2008).
65. See, e.g., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673–74 (8th Cir. 2007); Greenberg
v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003);
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488–89 (Cal. 1990); Phillips v. Irons,
No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005); Cohen, supra note
64, at 1146–47.
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tissue donation, and sperm from semen have all been struck down.66
States might then have no issue claiming unwanted fetuses or em-
bryos are therefore abandoned and up for grabs.67 However, there
could be a distinction between left behind and unwanted bodily ma-
terial that no one expects a third party could or would make use of,
and unwanted bodily material one intends to destroy precisely so
that no one can make use of it. A pregnant woman seeking an abor-
tion might wish to destroy the embryo or fetus precisely so the state
cannot force abandonment for its transfer to artificial womb. Possi-
bly one is not truly discarding material, rather affirmatively acting
to destroy material.68 Furthermore, there seems to be a distinction
between bodily materials such as saliva and blood when compared
to genetic fetal material. DNA and embryonic material are categori-
cally more powerful than discarded blood cells or organ tissue.69 There
is a widely accepted notion that an individual is inexplicably con-
nected to their DNA and genetic material—a natural affinity.70 Even
if a property interest claim to these materials fails, this presumed
connection could justify that without explicit consent or intention,
the materials cannot be abandoned.
The fact that states currently do not regulate embryos or pre-
embryos in the research, cryobank, or assisted reproductive medicine
arena, makes it seem as if our fear that states will forcibly seize un-
wanted embryos to grow them in artificial wombs stems from an in-
tuition that states care less about protecting potential life and instead
are largely just distraught by the idea of abortion.71 Arguably, the
state is masking its true interest—protecting society from what the
state deems to be an immoral or irrational choice—behind a façade of
protecting potential life. Unable to completely ban abortions, states
instead can make the process so arduous that women might feel pun-
ished to an extent. States imposing undue burdens, or any burdens,
on women seeking abortions exemplifies how their interests stem
66. See, e.g., Wash. Univ., 490 F.3d at 673; Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074; Moore,
793 P.2d at 488–89; Phillips, 2005 WL 4694579, at *6.
67. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 1146–47.
68. But see Phillips, 2005 WL 4694579, at *6 (disregarding a conversion claim because
the court held one cannot steal bodily material that has been discarded).
69. See Suresh Viswanath, An Analysis of Genetic Affinity as an Actionable Head of
Damages—ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, 8 SING. L. REV. (June 20, 2017), https://www
.singaporelawreview.com/juris-illuminae-entries/2017/an-analysis-of-genetic-affinity-as-an
-actionable-head-of-damages-acb-v-thomson-medical-pte-ltd [https://perma.cc/B38X-9CG5].
70. Id.
71. Furthermore, in order for artificial womb technology to come to use, there will
have to be vast experimentation, including the use of human embryos and fetuses. See
Hendricks, supra note 15, at 433 (“A government that had condoned the experiments neces-
sary to create reliable artificial wombs would be hard-pressed to justify using that technol-
ogy to compel motherhood.”).
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from a desire to limit the decision-making capacity of women because
of some outdated paternalistic stereotype or, more convincingly, from
the belief that the decision to terminate pregnancy is presumptively
wrong—not from their claimed interest in protecting potential life.72
Although the Court in Casey declared it was simply balancing
state interest with a woman’s autonomy,73 its rhetoric seems to pro-
vide states with quite a bit of power to structure and debase a
woman’s decision-making process. The Court “[e]mphasiz[ed] . . .
[all] abortion decision[s] should be ‘thoughtful,’ ‘informed,’ ‘deliberate,’
and made [only] after a ‘period of reflection.’”74 This language was re-
iterated in Gonzales v. Carhart.75 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, asserted, “it seems unexception[al] to conclude some women
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created
and sustained. . . . The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a
choice is well informed.”76 The Court seems to view a woman’s choice
in terms of a woman’s inevitable regret—regret that a state can “pro-
tect” against. Judgments about abortion might arise from inherent
moral judgments about a woman’s sexual conduct rather than the
moral status of the fetus. As one scholar noted, “[f]or example, many
abortion bans provide exceptions for cases of rape. The fetus produced
by . . . rape is no less alive than any other, suggesting that the real
concern may be the woman’s culpability for voluntary sex.”77 The
image of a pregnant woman throughout Court jurisprudence is but
“a ‘caricature’ who is ‘capable of the responsibility of motherhood, but
not of the full moral responsibility demanded by . . . procreative
choices.[’]”78 Therefore, it appears the state holds an “interest” in
protecting women from their own decisions—or at least the decisions
with which it disagrees.79
Arguably, the state does have an interest in protecting what it
might view to be borderline infanticide. Most everyone would agree
72. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 937–38 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
73. See id. at 851.
74. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Woman Scorned?: Resurrecting Infertile Women’s Decision-
Making Autonomy, 71 MD. L. REV. 339, 356 (2012) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 872, 885
(plurality opinion)).
75. See 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007).
76. Id. at 159.
77. Hendricks, supra note 15, at 336 (footnote omitted).
78. Madeira, supra note 74, at 361 (quoting Elizabeth Reilly, The “Jurisprudence of
Doubt”: How the Premises of the Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence Undermine
Procreative Liberty, 14 J.L. & POL. 757, 790–91 (1998)).
79. For example, the government denies funding for abortion. Because the government
is willing to fund more expensive medical procedures associated with childbirth, they are
not denying funds due to lack of resources; they are displaying their moral disapproval
of abortion.
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that aborting an eight- or nine-month-old fetus on the verge of birth,
notwithstanding threatening medical concerns, would be morally
repugnant. The state has a strong interest in deterring such con-
duct. However, absent extraordinary circumstances, most abortions
are not performed this late.80 Most women decide fairly early on
whether to terminate their pregnancy.81 Contrary to some jurispru-
dence and much literature, women are not feeble-minded creatures
that need protecting from their own irrational decisions. They are
perfectly capable of weighing the pros and cons of motherhood, the
advice and information provided to them by health care professionals,
and their likely emotional reaction or possibility of regret.82 Because
pregnancy is a fairly unpleasant and uncomfortable condition, with
side effects including nausea, weight gain, vomiting, etc., women who
do not wish to bear a child will have a strong incentive to cease preg-
nancy as soon as possible. Furthermore, there is much research
supporting mother-child bonding in utero.83 The further into the preg-
nancy a woman is, the more likely she has formed an emotional bond
with the fetus, and thus the less likely she is to choose an abortion.84 
For these reasons, concerns that women will be so indecisive as
to postpone an abortion procedure until it nearly mirrors infanticide
are somewhat ill-founded. We might view this state interest in pre-
venting murderous-like conduct as detached from any one being and
really a more generalized interest in protecting the sanctity of any
and all potential life, no matter how remote. However, in the context
of abortion, a standard so broad would fail to overcome a woman’s
free exercise of choice. Additionally, the state interest cannot logi-
cally extend quite that far, seeing how the government cannot forbid
the use of contraceptives. There seems to be a difference between
80. See Susan Dudley, Women Who Have Abortions, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N (2003),
https://5aa1b2xfmfh2e2mk03kk8rsx-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads
/women_who_have_abortions.pdf.
81. See id.
82. See Madeira, supra note 74, at 396 (arguing that “[t]hese decisions may even be
ones that the decision makers themselves will come to regret. But this inevitability is
inherent in the nature of human decision making and individual autonomy; imperfect
humans will not always make perfect choices. A suboptimal decision is not necessarily an
incompetent decision, and democratic ideals compel extreme caution before we foreclose
citizens’ ability to make certain choices for themselves. . . . [I]t is unnecessary (and im-
possible) to prove that women always make rational reproductive decisions; instead, we
must ensure that they have the autonomy to make those decisions, and that we accurately
conceptualize autonomy so as to guarantee and maximize this freedom of choice.”).
83. See Carol Sorgen, Bonding with Baby Before Birth, WEBMD (2003), https://www
.webmd.com/baby/features/bonding-with-baby-before-birth#1 [https://perma.cc/4DZ5-6JTS].
84. See id.; see also Dudley, supra note 80 (stating that “[m]ost abortions (88%) are
obtained in the first trimester of pregnancy”).
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this month’s egg, and this month’s fertilized egg.85 Any potential life
is then not the correct analysis.
Still, the scope of the state interest vocalized in Roe and Casey is
left vast; boundaries are unclear and motives concealed “under the
guise of protecting . . . potential life.”86 Roe does little to explore
whether the state interest in protecting potential life is actually per-
missible, and Casey, relying on precedent, fails to inquire further.
Starting with Casey, post-Roe decisions have moved away from strict
scrutiny and instead examined state interest under a test of quasi-
intermediate scrutiny with an undue burden standard.87 Under inter-
mediate scrutiny, the state action must be substantially related to
an important government interest.88 The burden of proof rests with
the government.89 However, courts faced with abortion regulations
have left the interest of “potential life” generally unchallenged,90 and
instead focused on whether regulation places an obstacle in the path
of a woman, an undue burden.91 We have seemed to accept the inter-
est in protecting potential life as “important” without question or
further definition—stripping the state from the duty of proving its
interest. Courts presume regulation to be legitimate as long as the
government has thrown in some potential-life language and does not
go too far as to totally prohibit abortions.92 “While the court is re-
quired to show some deference to the legislatures’ proffered purpose,
it need not accept it if it is a ‘mere “sham.”’”93 In no other context do
we allow moral sentiments to take reign over fundamental rights.94
85. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 1129 (“An attempt to justify assigning personhood to
preembryos based on the fact that preembyros are potential persons that have an in-
terest in becoming actual persons also faces significant obstacles. It implies that sperm
and egg are also potential persons that have interests, something that seems implausible.”).
86. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986).
87. I call this quasi-intermediate scrutiny because the Casey opinion really does not
articulate a level of scrutiny. It makes no statement that the goal of the law must be com-
pelling or important or necessary or substantially related to legitimate goals. Instead,
Casey mixes scrutiny together with undue burden to create general confusion. See
generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1992). See also Chemerinsky &
Goodwin, supra note 36, at 1219.
88. See Clark v. City of Shawnee, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1228 (D. Kan. 2017) (citing
U.S. v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2010)).
89. See id.
90. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion).
91. See id. at 874 (plurality opinion).
92. See id. at 992 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added)
(“[T]he joint opinion permits the State to pursue [its] interest [in potential life] . . . so
long as it is not too successful.”).
93. Jenny K. Jarrard, Note, The Failed Purpose Prong: Women’s Right to Choose in The-
ory, Not in Fact, Under the Undue Burden Standard, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 469, 484
(2014) (citation omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987)).
94. The Court has articulated it declines to do so in the context of abortion as well. I beg
to differ. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (“Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to
our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.”); Roe v. Wade,
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Courts review the purpose of legislation in other contexts, such as
free speech or exercise restrictions, in an attempt to weed out dis-
criminatory intent or any improperly motivated purpose.95 In the
context of abortion, the Court glosses over purpose and intent with-
out much depth, holding the interest in protecting potential life
acceptable under stare decisis.96
But what exactly comprises a state’s interest in “potential life”
is then left unclear. The term is thrown around without much con-
sideration of what it encompasses. Professor Dov Fox has unraveled
the term and revealed its use to cover four separate interests: (1)
“prenatal welfare interest,” or the preservation of unborn life; (2)
“postnatal welfare interests,” the protection from harmful conduct
before birth; (3) “social values interests,” the promotion of respect for
the unborn; and (4) “social effects interests,” the prevention of tangi-
ble harms to society at large.97 Using this framework, we can deter-
mine whether the state has a prenatal welfare interest, or a lesser
interest such as a social value interest. Likely, the protection of po-
tential life is really only a social value interest. Social value interests
do not rise to the “compelling” level that would enable a restriction
of rights.98 Instead, social value interests attempt to regulate moral-
ity or cultural ideals.99 Courts have accepted concern for respecting
the unborn, protecting society from “further coarsen[ing],” and up-
holding the perception of the “process [in] which life is brought into the
world.”100 This presumption, that prenatal life is inherently morally
valuable at any stage, is problematic because it essentially recog-
nizes when “life” begins. Both attempted and realized abortion restric-
tions throughout history further demonstrate how the debate stems
from social values and moral beliefs about abortion in general—not
prenatal or postnatal welfare interests.101 Government spending is
410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (“Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional mea-
surement, free of emotion and predilection.”). But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
156–57 (2007) (discussing an interest in protecting society against moral coarsening).
95. See, e.g., U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (explaining that the Court
may strike down an otherwise constitutional law for bad motive).
96. See Jarrard, supra note 93, at 478, 515 (“The courts . . . have tended to treat abor-
tion as if it exists in a legal vacuum. The analysis is infused with emotion.”).
97. Dov Fox, The State’s Interest in Potential Life, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 345, 346 (2015).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 349.
100. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157, 160 (2007) (citations omitted).
101. See generally id. (upholding prohibitions on intact D&E procedures, convinced
they were morally repugnant); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837–38 (1992)
(upholding informed consent, 24-hour waiting periods, mandatory ultrasound viewing,
but invalidating spousal notifications); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating a requirement that D&E abortions be performed
in hospitals because the procedure was safe, accessible, and easily administered in clinics);
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another example of how a state’s moral compass steers the wheel of
legislation. Childbirth is much more costly than abortion, yet the gov-
ernment freely funds one but not the other.102 The government is not
conserving resources or acting frugally when refusing to fund abortion;
rather, it is using its power of the purse to discourage abortions.103
Some scholars have even noted there was no backlash against abor-
tion rights “until 1980 when the Reagan presidential campaign made
a concerted effort to gain the support of fundamentalist Christians,”104
pointing to religion as a driving factor behind state interests.105 Up-
holding interests that rest purely on morality, social constructs, or
religion, arguably all impermissible purposes to deny fundamental
rights, blatantly disregards any test of intermediate scrutiny.
Courts should restore strict scrutiny in order to properly balance
and resolve each side’s rights in abortion. Currently, the protection of
potential life is so deep-seated that once stated, it outweighs any indi-
vidual right or liberty in the balancing test. No further questions are
asked of the state and no real balancing is done. Most regulations
passed by states purporting to further an interest in life have been
widely upheld under the review of undue burden—including laws on
fetal pain, biased counseling, unnecessary waiting periods, and ultra-
sound viewing.106
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding a state law requiring
a minor to obtain either parental consent or judicial approval of her choice to abort); H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding state law requiring parents to be notified
whenever possible); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating
requirements of parental consent for minors and spousal consent for wives); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (invalidating an abortion statute that required abortions to be
performed in hospitals and set up special procedures for hospital approval of abortions).
102. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297 (1980) (holding the government has no
affirmative obligation to pay for abortions, even if it does pay for childbirth); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977).
103. Tax dollars also go towards “Crisis Pregnancy Centers,” or CPCs, highly biased
pro-life centers that provide inaccurate medical information and employ coercive tactics
to convince women not to get an abortion. See Jenavieve Hatch, Shady Crisis Pregnancy
Center Audited, Responds in Shady Way, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2017, 5:01 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/shady-crisis-pregnancy-center-audited-responds
-by-suing-auditor_us_58cbfba2e4b0be71dcf443e4 [https://perma.cc/Z57A-XSYR]; Jennifer
Ludden, States Fund Pregnancy Centers That Discourage Abortion, NPR (Mar. 9, 2015,
4:32 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/03/09/391877614/states-fund
-pregnancy-centers-that-discourage-abortion [https://perma.cc/CA4S-A3Z3].
104. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 36, at 1210 (citing LINDA GREENHOUSE &
REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 259–62 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2010)).
105. Cf. David Masci, American Religious Groups Vary Widely in Their Views of Abor-
tion, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/22
/american-religious-groups-vary-widely-in-their-views-of-abortion [https://perma.cc/Z3JC
-TVUJ]; Public Opinion on Abortion, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2017), http://www.pewforum
.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion [https://perma.cc/KL93-BCA3].
106. See Elyse Whitney Grant, Assessing the Constitutionality of Reproductive Technolo-
gies Regulation: A Bioethical Approach, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 997, 1000, 1010 (2009).
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The undue burden standard does little to actually protect or bal-
ance the interests of the woman. It instead allows the state to burden
just enough before wholly tipping the scale.107 Rather than testing
the legitimacy of state regulations, the court blindly accepts and then
proceeds to search for any remaining semblance of a woman’s auton-
omy right. If found, the state regulation is upheld. Even under a strict
scrutiny balancing test, once potential life is plugged into the equa-
tion, it is likely to do no better a job at protecting a woman’s right
than past ineffective balancing tests.108 In applying strict scrutiny,
the Court should strike down any interest articulated in the blanket
and formulaic words: “potential life,” thereby forcing the state to de-
vise a more narrowly tailored, delineated, and persuasive interest—
not enshrouded in moral or theological beliefs. Courts could remedy
the perversion in current jurisprudence by invalidating the undue
burden standard and denying a boundless interest of “potential life”
in a balancing test under strict scrutiny.109
Additionally, this newly defined state interest would have to be
weighty enough to prevail over a woman’s interest in bodily integrity.
The state, in mandating womb emptying for transfer to artificial
womb, would be forcing the woman to undergo a medical procedure.
Abortion itself is a medical procedure. Assuming, for example, both
procedures were exactly the same, no one being riskier to the health
of the woman than the other, the state might be able to mandate
that the woman empty her womb. Yet, absent any monumental
scientific advancements, the current procedure for extracting the
fetus would be a Caesarean section—far more risky than an abor-
tion.110 Furthermore, as to be later discussed, even if the state could
prevail over a woman’s bodily integrity, with both procedures identi-
cal, a woman’s right not to create a child of her own genetic affinity
would triumph.
Rather than rubber-stamping “potential life” as a generalized ex-
cuse for governmental legislation, judges and lawmakers should bet-
ter consider what type of interest is actually at play to more precisely
107. See id. at 1001 (“The ‘balancing’ prong has allowed the Court to pay lip service to
the fundamental right at issue, while simultaneously giving effect to the moral concerns
implicit in abortion regulation.”).
108. See Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance: Judicial Review of Abortion Regu-
lations, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1337 (2013).
109. See id.
110. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 36, at 1218 (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
UNSAFE ABORTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE INCIDENCE OF UNSAFE
ABORTION AND ASSOCIATED MORTALITY IN 2008 14 (6th ed. 2011), http://apps.who.int/iris
/bitstream/handle/10665/44529/978924150118_eng.pdf;jsessionid=8BEE544879F0175B18
AEE9F20CF6C27C?sequence=1) (“According to the World Health Organization, a legal
abortion is as safe as a penicillin shot.”).
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settle reproductive conflicts.111 Without an abandonment of the viabil-
ity standard and a redefinition of state interests that follow, artificial
wombs would allow fetal independence to occur at or near conception,
having the practical effect of banning abortion and extinguishing
any liberty interest a woman holds in terminating her pregnancy.112
IV. UNBUNDLING A WOMAN’S RIGHTS
In the context of abortion, “pro-life” proponents argue that from
the moment of conception, a fetus deserves the same inalienable
“right to life” as any other human. “Pro-choice” advocates argue for
an unfettered right to an abortion protected by the Constitutional
right to privacy. Current legal and political discussion is clouded by
the misconception that the right to have an abortion is comprised of
one right: the right to terminate a fetus.113 Instead, a woman’s right
to an abortion should be unbundled to reveal more than one single
right. Not only should a woman have the right to terminate her preg-
nancy, but also a right to ensure the fetus does not survive by any
other apparatus—the right not to have a biological child of her own
genetics out there roaming the streets.114 “Terminating a pregnancy
is but a means to an end. The end is preventing motherhood.”115
Women who choose an abortion do not simply have the procedure to
avoid being pregnant; they have the procedure to avoid motherhood
and to avoid any attributed feelings of motherhood or emotional tur-
moil that accompanies giving a child of your own genetic makeup up
for adoption and forever knowing it is “out there somewhere.”116 It is
likely this right is implicitly buried within current abortion juris-
prudence; otherwise, forced adoptions would have ended abortion
111. See Fox, supra note 97, at 345, 349.
112. See Jee Son, supra note 35, at 219. But would this analysis change if a fetus’s health
and safety “ha[d] been seriously altered by [the woman’s] conduct during pregnancy . . . .
Could the court enjoin the [woman] to place the fetus in [an artificial womb for] . . . the
best interest of the child?” Abecassis, supra note 32, at 23.
113. See Randall & Randall, supra note 23, at 292.
114. Id. But see Langford, supra note 18, at 265 (quoting PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS,
THE REPRODUCTION REVOLUTION: NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES 135–36 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1984)) (“We do not allow a mother to kill her newborn baby because she does not wish
either to keep it or to hand it over for adoption . . . it is difficult to see why we should give
this right to a woman in respect of a foetus [sic] she is carrying, if her desire to be rid of
the foetus [sic] can be fully satisfied without threatening the life of the foetus [sic].”).
115. Langford, supra note 18, at 265.
116. See Randall & Randall, supra note 23, at 292 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term—Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life
and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1973)) (“Once the fetus can be severed from the [womb]
by a process which enables it to survive, leaving the abortion decision to private choice
would confer not only a right to remove an unwanted fetus from one’s body but also an
entirely separate right to ensure its death.” (footnote omitted)).
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procedures in all but the extremely rare case in which a woman’s
health was jeopardized previability. Under current abortion juris-
prudence, the Supreme Court does not further define or delineate a
woman’s right to an abortion.117 Nor does it need to. Today’s abor-
tion methods invariably involve the termination of pregnancy and
the termination of fetal life.
But, with the advent of artificial wombs, it is not unimaginable
that “pro-life” advocates will suggest artificial wombs as a solution to
abortion, where we can simply remove the unwanted fetus and trans-
fer it to an artificial womb for it to be later adopted. States, having
an interest in “protecting life,” might see this as no issue (beyond the
huge economic and social impact of housing millions of unwanted or
orphaned fetuses). This is not a viable solution.118 If artificial wombs
were used as an alternative to abortion, women could face the pos-
sibility of losing their right to control their parenting preferences.
They would instead be faced with the “catch-22” of raising a child
unprepared or underfinanced, or terminating their pregnancy but
bringing a genetically related child into existence.119
V. RIGHT NOT TO BE A MOTHER
Most would assume that women do not want to be mothers be-
cause it is “just not the right time,” or they just cannot afford the child
now. “Everyone agrees, in theory, that if a woman wants to have a
child, but fears she cannot afford to care for it, alleviating her poverty
would be preferable to merely pointing her to an abortion clinic.”120
This view champions women’s equality to avoid the dilemma of abor-
tions at all. But, the need for an abortion and the need for abortion
rights are two separate discussions.121 Implicitly tucking women
away into this neatly constructed and ingrained gender stereotype
fails to recognize that women are deserving of equal rights under
117. A woman also has the right to refuse medical treatment. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990). Transferring a fetus from womb to artificial
womb, however, would require a Caesarean section to ensure the fetus was not harmed or
disfigured in extraction. C-sections are far more invasive and pose many more risks to a
woman’s health than current abortion techniques. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNSAFE ABOR-
TION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE INCIDENCE OF UNSAFE ABORTION AND
ASSOCIATED MORTALITY IN 2008 14 (6th ed. 2011) (abortion); Alexandra Sifferlin, Why U.S.
Women Still Die During Childbirth, TIME (Sept. 27, 2016), http://time.com/4508369/why
-u-s-women-still-die-during-childbirth [https://perma.cc/DK6R-ZADR] (C-sections). Because
of this, it seems highly unlikely that women will be subjected to the riskier medical pro-
cedure and denied the right to refuse treatment.
118. Pun intended.
119. See Langford, supra note 18, at 267.
120. Hendricks, supra note 15, at 356 (footnote omitted).
121. See id. at 358.
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the law. Whether she needs to have an abortion122 should not be the
inquiry. Rather, the focus should turn on whether she wants to have
an abortion.
Some have defined this ancillary right as a “negative right to re-
produc[e]”—“the freedom either to have children or to avoid having
them.”123 The right to parent as distinct from the right to pregnancy
is no new concept. Surrogates carry an intended couple’s child as an
altruistic act or because they thoroughly enjoy the experience of
pregnancy. These women have a procreative interest in pregnancy,
but have no desire to parent the child they are carrying—most of the
time.124 Likewise, parents who adopt have the desire to parent, yet
might find it unnecessary to propagate their own genes. So, too, for
the purposes of artificial wombs should the right not to be a parent
be distinct from the right not to gestate. The Roe opinion holds a
woman’s due process right of privacy is “broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”125
Although the Court does not specify what that right entails, it clearly
lists the detriments from denying that choice:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and contin-
uing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.126
The concurrence continues in explaining that “the interests of
a woman in giving of her physical and emotional self during preg-
nancy and the interests that will be affected throughout her life by
the birth and raising of a child are of a far greater degree of signifi-
cance and personal intimacy” than other protected privacy cases.127
This rhetoric implies that within a woman’s right to terminate preg-
nancy lies the right not to be a mother. The Court continually reiter-
ates the considerations a woman must make when choosing whether
122. I use the word “need” to mean what someone might think to be the financial or
socially responsible behavior, not health needs.
123. Mutcherson, supra note 24, at 44 (quoting JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22 (1994)).
124. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
125. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
126. Id. at 153.
127. Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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to exercise her right to an abortion, some centering on the burdens
of imposed motherhood.128
Although the Court appears to have implicitly held there is a
right not to be mother, because previous abortion procedures effec-
tively ended a fetus’s life, the Court was not faced with answering
whether, within the context of abortion, a woman has a right not to
create a child or have her genetic makeup dispersed in fetal or em-
bryonic form.
VI. RIGHT NOT TO CREATE A CHILD
There seems to be a common misconception that women have
abortions for relatively trivial and selfish reasons.129 For most women,
abortion is not just refusal to care for a child, but a decision not to
create a child.130 Therefore, procreative rights must also encompass
the right not to propagate using your own genetic material. An indi-
vidual arguably has a tangible interest in controlling the use of her
own genes. Forced procreation would cause emotional harm and bur-
dens in knowing a child with whom you share a genetic tie exists
somewhere in the great unknown.
There might be moral, familial, or social pressure to raise a child
you have borne. Closed adoptions developed initially out of a desire
to protect the parties from public scrutiny or the stigmatization of
adoption.131 Over time, reasons for anonymity evolved to protect in-
terests in finality and protect against exploitation. Similarly, anony-
mous sperm and egg donors have an expectation of privacy—the
promise of confidentiality was most likely the driving factor for their
donation. Reports suggest donation decreases substantially when
the promise of anonymity is removed—even when legal protections
128. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted) (stating that “[b]ecause motherhood has a dramatic impact on a
woman’s educational prospects, employment opportunities, and self-determination, re-
strictive abortion laws deprive her of basic control over her life. For these reasons, ‘the
decision whether or not to beget or bear a child’ lies at ‘the very heart of this cluster of
constitutionally protected choices.’ ”).
129. See Madeira, supra note 74, at 357 (citations omitted) (quoting Representative
Dick Armey who stated that providing abortion services would “ ‘condone the self-in-
dulgent conduct of the body of a woman who has already demonstrated’ that she was
‘damned careless with it in the first place.’ ”).
130. No evidence suggests that “having an abortion is any more dangerous to a woman’s
long-term mental health than delivering and parenting a child that she did not intend
to have.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 127, 183 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Mental Health: Myths and Realities, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y
REV. 8, 8 (2006)).
131. See Rosemary Cabellero, Open Records Adoption: Finding the Missing Piece, 30
S. Ill. U. L.J. 291, 292 (2006).
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against parenthood remain.132 Men who donate sperm are not told
when or if their sperm is used. They have no knowledge if their
donation created fifty kids or zero kids. However, if the donor had
knowledge a child was in fact created, he might tend to view his role
as something beyond a donor.133 Glenn Cohen defines this harm as
“attributional parenthood,” “a harm that comes from the social assign-
ment of the status of parent to [a] provider of genetic material that
persists notwithstanding the fact that the legal system has declared
him or her a nonparent.”134 The resulting child might seek out their
genetic parent, regardless of promises of anonymity.135 Whether the
child ultimately contacts the genetic parent or not, the parent might
be fraught with guilt or responsibility that she owes some sort of
relationship to the child, even though the law frees her of any type
of obligation.136
Cohen discusses three categories of people who might attribute
parenthood to an individual albeit the law holding otherwise: “those
outside the relationship, the resulting child, and the individual him-
self.”137 Those outside the parent-child relationship, such as strang-
ers, onlookers, or even grandparents and relatives, are arguably of
lesser concern than the child and the “parent.” How society defines
parenthood is only important to the extent that it actually influ-
ences or shapes how the individual perceives their own relationship.
The resulting child is a strong testament of “attributional parent-
hood.”138 Children created by anonymous sperm or egg donation
often go to great lengths to discover their genetic ties.139 Even if they
are not looking for a “parent,” they might be curious to find under-
standing or a sense of belonging to shape what they believe to be
their identity. They embark on this journey of self-discovery unbe-
knownst to their genetic parent, sidestepping protections of anonym-
ity. Whether the child is successful in their pursuits is irrelevant;
arguably, the individual, the “parent,” is harmed merely by the loom-
ing possibility.
132. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 1145.
133. Studies show donors do not want to learn basic information about the sex or birth
date of a resulting child or even whether a child was born. See Ellen Waldman, The Parent
Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM.
U. L. REV. 1021, 1049–50 (2004).
134. Cohen, supra note 64, at 1125.
135. THE DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, Success Stories, https://www.donorsiblingregistry
.com/success-stories [https://perma.cc/3Y54-5SC2].
136. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 1135–36.
137. See id. at 1136 (footnote omitted).
138. See id. at 1119.
139. THE DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, Our History And Mission, https://www.donorsib
lingregistry.com/about-dsr/history-and-mission [https://perma.cc/7NXL-4BNJ].
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The emotional distress an individual might suffer from attri-
butional parenthood is far from trivial.140 Social constructions of
parenthood often shape self-attributions of parenthood, causing the
individual to feel some sort of moral obligation or burden. It might
be hard for an individual to deny their genetic child a meeting when
that child wants nothing more than to see that “he has your eyes.”
An individual might feel they owe the child something, an intangi-
ble indebtedness.
The importance of genetic affinity has been recognized elsewhere.
In a recent Singapore case, ACB v Thomson Medical, a court awarded
damages for the loss of genetic affinity when a couple using in vitro
fertilization (IVF) did not receive a child of genetic relation.141 The
court recognized couples undergoing IVF treatments do so with a
conscious desire to create a child of their own genetic makeup.142
Denying them “the ordinary human experience [of parenthood]” con-
stituted a profound loss in the eyes of the court.143 If a couple can
recover for the loss of genetic affinity, it follows that an individual
should be also compensated when they are looking to avoid that
genetic affinity and it is instead imposed. A woman wishing to termi-
nate her fetus, and not have it transferred to artificial womb, is acting
with the intention of avoiding genetic affinity. To inflict this procre-
ative linkage would not be simple negligence like a sperm mix-up
mishap, but an outright act in defiance of her overt intentions.
Even if the woman is not legally obligated to parent a resulting
child, when she opposes transfer and implantation of her embryo or
fetus into an artificial womb, she is harmed and suffers attributional
parenthood when, despite her wishes, a fetus is transferred and suc-
cessfully gestated to term. A recognized legal and compensable right
not to create a child would remedy this situation.
CONCLUSION
With the potential of substantially improving the reproductive
successes of many, the scientific advance of artificial womb technology
is exciting. However, if artificial wombs are used as an alternative to
abortion, women could face the possibility of losing their procreative
rights. Current abortion jurisprudence therefore needs to evolve with
the new technology. Courts should abandon the viability standard and
require states to redefine their interests. Without an abandonment
140. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 1142–44.
141. See Viswanath, supra note 69.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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of the viability standard and a redefinition of state interests that
follow, artificial wombs would allow fetal independence to occur at
or near conception, having the practical effect of banning abortion and
extinguishing any liberty interest a woman holds in ending embryonic
life. Disallowing states and the Court to determine a point of viability,
a point at which they are inherently defining “life,” would properly
leave this private choice in the woman’s hands. In abandoning the vi-
ability standard, the Court would be faced with balancing and recon-
sidering under what circumstances a state’s interest dominates.
Courts must require states to articulate their interest in banning
abortion in a more detailed and coherent manner. Rather than
rubber-stamping “potential life” as a generalized excuse for govern-
mental legislation, judges and lawmakers should better decipher what
type of interest is actually at play and whether there is an improperly
motivated purpose. States should not be able to ban or burden a
woman’s right to an abortion when its justification for such ban largely
stems from feelings of morality. Courts could remedy the current de-
ficiencies in abortion jurisprudence by denying the boundless inter-
est of “potential life,” invalidating the undue burden standard, and
applying a balancing test under traditional strict scrutiny.
Finally, a woman’s procreative rights must be unbundled to en-
compass more than just the right to terminate pregnancy. Because
previous abortion procedures effectively ended a fetus’s life, the Court
was not faced with answering whether, within the context of abor-
tion, a woman had a right not to create a child or have her genetic
material dispersed. Forced procreation would cause emotional harm
and burdens in knowing a child with whom you share a genetic tie
exists somewhere in the great unknown. The advent of artificial
wombs would force us to recognize these tangible harms, like attri-
butional parenthood, produced by denying women procreative rights
beyond pregnancy.
Artificial wombs should be embraced as a great medical advance-
ment that has added to the catalog of assisted reproductive technol-
ogy options. The use of this technology should not be taken as a
simple alternative to current abortion procedures. Instead, artificial
wombs should be used in any situation that maintains a woman’s
right to choice over her body and the outcome of her potential fetus.
With this new technology on the horizon, there is a need to reconsider
current abortion jurisprudence and redefine or expand the constitu-
tional right of procreation.
